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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the State of Utah 
EARL W. WIL:SON, doing business as 
Wilson's Used Car and HARTFORD 
ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY COM-
P ANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE IND·USTRIAL CO·MMISSIO·N OF 
UTAH, RO·BERTA BARNEY, widow, 
and BEVERLY BARNEY, m in o r 
daughter of Frank Barney, deceased, 
n.e fen~arnts. 




In view of the brief filed by the defendants in this 
case, plaintiffs deem it necessary to file a reply brief, 
touching both on matters of fact and matters of law. 
In this brief we shall refer to the various parties in 
the same terms as we used in our main brief. 
All italics in quotations are ours, unless otherwise 
noted. 
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THE FACTS 
We regret the necessity of treating the facts in a 
reply brief. We realize the futility of engaging in a 
"'tis so-' 'taint so'" argument as to what the record 
reveals. But we feel that counsel has drawn some un-
warranted inferences from the testimony, and so th~t 
the Court may not be misled, we desire to note our ex-
ception to certain purported statements of fact in the 
defendant's brief. In so doing we do not wish to he un-
derstood as inferring or implying that counsel has de-
liberately mis-stated the record. We think that any un-
warranted inferences which may have been drawn are 
the result on1y of counsel's enthusiasm in advancing the 
cause which he represents. 
On page 2 of defendants' brief, it is said that ''Bar-
ney was supposed to be on the job at 8 A.M., and was 
to work until 5 P.M. (Tr. 10, 11, 23, 25, 28, 35, 86), leav-
ing Barney to regulate, within those hours, his own time 
and do the work most needed to be done.''And again 
on p. 4, it is asserted that ''Barney, as well as all other 
employees of Wilson, were supposed to be on the job 
from 8:00 in the morning to 5 :00 in the evening.'' Ap-
parently the inference intended to be conveyed by coun-
sel is that B.arney was required to report for work at 
8 :00 A.M. and to remain ''on the job'' until 5 :00 P.M., 
but that if work were slack between those hours he could 
employ his time as he saw fit. Such an inference is hard-
ly warranted by the record. Although at one point in 
his testimony Wilson stated that it ''was generally un-
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derstood he (Barney) 'Yas supposed to go to work at 
eight o'clock,'' ( Tr. 25) it is clear from the record as 
a whole, and particularly from the balance of Wilson's 
testimony that Barney was not required to keep hard 
and fast hours, and that what Wilson meant was that 
ordinarily Barney came to work about 8:00 A.M. 'The 
following excerpts from Wilson's testimony are salient 
on this point: 
"Q. . · ... did he (Barney) have regular hours~ 
A. No. 
Q. When did he ordilnarily go to work~ 
A. About eight o'clock." (Tr. 11) 
At p. 3 of their brief defendants assert that ''Barney 
was supposed to be working in Sait Lake· City on that 
day but was being sent to Magna to pick up an auto-
mobile. He was then to return to Salt Lake as soon as 
possible with the automobile and to pick up his work 
according to his assignment in Salt Lake. Barney wasn't 
required or expected to report for work at Magna (Tr. 
27, 28, 29), but merely, as stated above, to get the car 
and then report for work in Salt Lake.'' 
By this statement counsel would apparently have 
the Court believe that Barney was specially directed to 
hustle out to ~fagna, return immediately with the auto-
mobile, and then put in a full day's shift at Wilson's 
place of business in Salt Lake City. There is nothing in 
the record to warrant such an inference. Whatthe record 
does show is that Barney was to go out t0 Magna, and 
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4 
if r1e'P~aiJrs ~on the car w~ere not complete.d to see that such 
re'parirs wer~e completed a,nd to· try to britng ,f}he C()A1 into 
S~alt L~ake by·nO'on. The testimony of Wilson on this point 
is as follows : 
•' Q. Did you know what the status of the repairs 
on that car was on that morning~ 
A. I do not. 
Q. So you don't know of your own knowledge 
whether it was ready to come back to Salt 
Lake or notY 
A. No. 
* * * * 
Q. So that if the car that he was supposed to 
bring in for repairs was to be worked on, 
that would have to be done first~ 
A. Yes. 
* * * * 
Q. Suppose this car needed further repairs, 
would he have worked on it~ 
A. Either him or Mr. Foote would. 
Q. Who was in charge out there~ 
A. Mr. Barney was. 
Q. So the work· would he done under his direc-
tion, wouldn't it Y 
A. Yes.'' ( Tr. 15-16). 
And again, in respons·e to questions hy Commis-
sioner Egan, Wilson testified as follows : 
Q. Did you tell him (Barney) when to bring it 
(the car) in~ 
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.. A.. Yes, supposed to be in by Noon. 
~ * ~ ~ 
Q. So far as you were concerned, it didn't n1ake 
anY difference how he "Tould get it, but you 
w~nted it in b~~ noon 1 
A. As near as he could get it.'' (Tr. 25) 
Further testimony that Barney would have worked 
in Salt Lake only in the afternoon of the day of the fatal 
accident, if he had not been killed is found in Tr. 27, 29. 
\\-r e have searched the record in vain for any testimony 
to support the assertion of defendants that Barney was 
expected to work all day in Salt Lake. 
We also disagree with the statement on p. 3 of de-
fendants' brief· that "It had be€n planned and was the 
usual custom that Barney was to take or would have 
taken his employer's wrecker to Magna to pick up this 
automobile, but the wrecker was out of repair on this 
particular day; therefore~ Barney was left to seek his 
own transportation to Magna.'' 
Barney had worked for Wilson· on his contract of 
employment for three days prior to the fatal accident, 
and. the evidence is abundant and undisputed that Barney 
had always furnished his own transportation, wherever 
he had been required to go. There is not a scintil1a of 
evidence in the record that Barney had ever had the 
use of either the wrecker or any other vehicle owned 
and used by Wilson in his business. Under these cir-
cumstances we are at a loss to understand how defend-
ants can so blandly assert that it had, been plm!wned and 
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6 
it wa.s the US'Ual custom for Barney to take his employer's 
wrecker and pick up the car in Magna. 
We have taken this much time and space to point 
out to the Court the difference between the facts as 
stated in defendants' brief and the facts as revealed by 
the record because much of defendants' argument is 
based on a misconception of what the facts are. Defend-
ants' position rests on a foundation of facts which exist 
only in the imagination of counsel for defendants, and 
when that unreal foundation is destroyed the argument 
which rests upon it must also come toppling down. 
THE LAW 
There is no disagreement between counsel for the 
respective parties that the single issue for the Court to 
determine is whether the fatal injuries sustained by 
Barney arose out of, or in the course of his employment. 
vVhen we prepared our original brief we were somewhat 
handicapped, since we did not and could not know what 
theory would be relied upon by the defendants to sup-
port the award of the commission. We therefore found 
it necessary to make a shot-gun argument. We there 
treated briefly every possible theory of which we were 
aware, upon which defendants might rely to sustain the 
award of the Commission, and we attempted to demon-
strate that none of them were applicable to the facts of 
this case. Since our brief was filed, defendants have 
filed a brief in which they concede the general rule: that 
employees traveling to or from their employer's place 
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of business, are not in the course of their en1ployu1ent, 
and injuries sustained by en1ployees so traveling do not 
arise out of or in the course of their employment, and 
hence are not compensable under the \V orkmen 's Com-
pensation Act. Defendants rely on the special mission 
or special errand doctrine (which is a well-recognized 
exception to the general rule above stated) to sustain 
the award of the Commission. The real and extrem·ely 
narrow issue before the Court, then, is whether Barney 
was engaged in a special mission for his employer at 
the time- of his death. If he was, he was killed in the 
course of his employment and the award of the Com-
mission must be sustained. If not, he was not killed in 
the course of his employment and the award of the Com-
mission must be set aside. During the balance of this 
brief, we shall attempt to answer the arguments ad-
vanced by defendants, and to show conclusively that at 
the time he received his fatal injuries Barney was not 
engaged in a special mission, but was merely enroute 
to his daily work. 
A. ~ARNEY \\T AS NOT OK COMPANY TIME 
WHEN HE vV AS KILLED. EVEN IF IT 
BE AD!iiTTED THAT BARNEY WAS 
ON COl\IP ANY TIME, DEFENDANTS' 
POSITION IS NOT IMPRO·VED. 
Defendants apparently rely quite heavily on the 
fact that the accident occurred at 8 :15 A.M., and that 
Barney ordinarily went to work at 8 :00 A.M. On p. 6 of 
their brief ·they ·say: ''Had this ·accident occurred· off 
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compO!YIJY hours and had Barn.ey been merely ·On his way 
to do negular W·O'rk, he rno d.oub t w'ould have been in a 
much miffe.rent sitwation. But we do not have, in this 
case, those circumstances to contend with. Barney was 
on compO!Yiry time • * * *" 
The argument is transparently without merit. We 
think that we have amply demonstrated, heretofore, that 
Barney did not have regular hours, although he or-
dinarily went to work at about 8 :00 A.M., and he could 
only be said to be "on company time" when he was 
actually on his employer's premises or otherwise acting 
in furtherance of his master's business. However, even if 
it be conceded that Barney was required to commence 
his daily work at 8 :00 A.M., the position of defendants 
is not helped. A slovenly emp1oyee cannot, by ha.bituall~ 
leaving his home at the time when he is supposed to 
report for work, and by thus travelling to work upon 
''company time'' throw on to his employer the burden 
of the risks of the road incurred by him while travelling 
to and from work. It would be a monstrous rule that 
would on the one hand deny the benefits of the compen-
sation act to diligent and conscientious employees who 
left their homes sufficiently nearly to arrive at their 
employer's p:lace of business at the required time for 
starting the day's work, and on the other hand, to per-
mit slovenly and derelict employees to ·enjoy advantages 
beyond those intended to be creruted by the L·egislature, 
by reason of the fact that they left their homes late and 
travelled all or part of the distance to th~eir place of work 
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on ~'company tin1e .. , ,, ... e think this is so n1anifest that 
there can be no need to argue the point at length, and 
hence "\Ye do not labor it further. 
B. B~-\.R.XEY ,,-r_.A.S XOT .:\CTING lTNDER 
SPECI~\L ORDERS ... lXD HE WAS NOT 
EXG ... -\.GED IX ... -\. SPECIAL ~fiSSION. 
HE ,, ... ___ -\.S ~IERELY TR ... -\. \TELLING TO 
,, ... ORK. 
\\T e have heretofore indicated that "\Ye believe that 
defendants' entire argument is premised on a miscon-
ception of the facts. Defendants assume that Barney 
"~as supposed to work all day in Salt Lake City on the 
date of the fatal accident, and that he was specially 
directed by his employer to abandon temporarily his 
work in Salt Lake and go to Magna for the purpose of 
bringing an automobile to Salt Lake. We submit that 
the record does not justify this assumption, but we do 
not concede that even if it did that the award should be 
sustained. 
The special mission doctrine finds its most usual 
application in those cases where the employee has re-
ported for work at his employer's place of business, and 
has been directed by his superior to suspend temporarily, 
the performance of his usua1 duties, and to leave the 
employer's premises for the purpose of performing some 
special mission or errand. The doctrine finds occasional 
application in cases where an employee has been directed 
to perform some service for his employer while travelling 
to or from work, such as to purchase supplies or make 
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deliveries. But in this latter class of cases the service to 
be performed must be the principal reason for making 
the trip, and not a mere incident to it. See Greer v. Ind. 
Comm., 74 Ut. 379, 279 P. 900. The theory upon which 
cases of the latter class rest is that the employee at-
taches ·himself to his day's work when he performs a 
mission for his employer on the way to work, or that 
he does not detach himself from his day's work until 
after he has completed his employer's mission which is 
to be accomplished on his way hom.e from work. Clearly 
the facts of this case do not bring it within the special 
mission doctrine. Barney had not yet attach~d himself 
to his day's work. He was not acting in furtherance of 
his master's business. So far as the record shows he 
had no errands to perform, no missions to accomplish, 
no purchases to make, no supplies to pick up, no finished 
work to deliver, on his way from Sa:lt Lake to Magna. 
He was in no sense furthering his master's business. He 
was not under his master's -control. He was free to 
travel by any route and by any means of conveyance 
which he should choose. 
In the very nature of things it was impossible for 
him to attach himself to his day's work until he arrived 
at Magna. As pointed out in our main brief (p. 6), it 
was implicit if not explicit in Barney's instructions, that 
he he certain that the repairs on the automobile were 
completed before he should bring it to Salt Lake. Clearly 
he could not do this until he arrived at Magna. Even if 
it be conceded (which it is not), that Barney's sole duty 
was to drive the car immediately back to Salt Lake, he 
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11 . 
could not do this, and hence could not begin his service 
to his employer until he arrived at Magna and repairs 
on the said car, 'Yere completed. While he was enroute 
from Salt Lake to ~fagna he 'vas doing nothing morie 
nor less than travelling from his home to work, the same 
as Foote, ·and most other ordinary employees. 
The argument of defenda~ts is conclusively an-
swered in the reasoning of the Court in Vitagraph, Inc., 
v. Ind. Comm., 96 Ut. 190, 85 Pac. (2d) 601, wherein it 
was said: 
''The plant or situs· need not always or con-
stantly be in one place. A familiar example is the 
case of a mason or carpenter working for a. build-
ing contractor. He may work for a time on a 
building being erected on A Street and then work 
for a time on a building on B Street and then 
on C Street. Each of such buildings is for the 
time the plant or locus of his work, and his em-
ployee re:Zationship be:gifns when he arrives .at 
his work and ends when he leaves, the situs there-
of .. " 
That language is applicable to the facts in the case 
at bar. Barney might be s.ent to Magna or Ogden or s:alt 
Lake, and whereever he was sent, became~ for the time 
being, his place of work. But he did not attach himself 
to his work until he arrived at his employer's place of 
business. 
May we offer a furth~r ·example to illustrate what 
we mean. Suppose John Doe is a building contractor, 
and Richard Roe is a carpenter empJ.oyed by him. Doe 
·dire.cts Roe to pet·form certain carpentry work on a 
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12 
house on A Street. On . Wednesday Roe completes the 
work and telephones Doe to learn where he shall work 
on Thursday. Doe instructs Roe to return the next day 
to the house on A Street to do some additional work 
and then to gather up the tools and materials and take 
them over to a house on B Street, and to work on the 
house on B Street on Thursday afternoon. Roe is killed 
while driving from his home to the house on A Street 
on Thursday morning. We think that under the facts as 
given in that example Roe's dependents are not entitled 
to compensation, since Roe had not yet attached himself 
to his day's work. And generically the facts given in 
our examp[e case are identical to the facts in the case 
a;t bar. 
We invite the attention of the .Court to the language 
of the Supreme Court of California in Ocean Accident 
& Guaranty Co. v. Ind. Acdt. Comm., 173. Cal. 313, 159 
Pac. 1041 L .. R.A. 1917B, 336, and quoted with approval 
by our Court in Vitagraph Inc. v. Ind. Comm., 85 Pac. 
(2d) 601, 607: 
'' 'In the very broadest sense, of course, it is 
true that an injury which happens to a man who 
is on his way to his place of employment is 
an injury growing out of and incidental to his 
employment,' since a necessary part of (Sic) 
the employment is that the employee shall go to 
and return from his place of labor. But it is to be 
noted that the right tlo am ~award is (YI)Ot founded 
upon 1t:he fact that the !ilnjury g'J10W'S out of arnd is 
incidental to his e.mp,~oyment. It is fovunded upon 
the pact that the s-ervice he is rendering at fhe 
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tim~e of the injury gr-ows out of and is inciment·al 
f.o the ·employment. Therefore, an employee go-
ing to and from his place of employment is not 
rendering any service, and begins to render such 
service only when, as has been said, arriving at 
the place of his employment, he proceeds to use 
some instrumentality provided, by means of which 
he immediately places himself in a position to 
perform his tasks'. '' (Italics added.) 
C. ANALYSIS O·F AUTH·ORITIES CITED 
BY DEFENDANTS. 
Defendants apparently rely strongly on Chandler 
v. Ind. Comm., 60 Ut. 387, 208 P. 499. We must confess 
that this case is against our position. However, we think 
the case is wrongly decided. It has never been followed, 
although it was cited with approval in Kahn Bros. Co. 
v. Ind. Comm., 75 Ut. 145, 283 .P. 1054. An attempt was 
made to distinguish the Chandler case in the la:ter case 
of Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Ind. Comm., 79 Ut. 189, 
8 Pac. (2d) 617. We can see no genuine difference he-
tween the two cases, and we think the Fidelity case im-
pliedly overrules the Chandler ca.se. We think that the 
Chandler case should be specifically overruled. The 
simple facts of that case were that the emp,loyee was 
bitten by a dog while walking from his home to his em-
ployer's garage for the purpose of commencing his day's 
work. He had no errands or missions to perform. He was 
not in any way serving the intereg;ts of his employer at 
the time. So far as the statement of facts contained in 
the opinion of the Court reveals, Chandler was in no 
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different position than any other ~employee on his way 
to work in the morning. Said the Court _at 208 Pac., page 
500: 
''He (Chandler) was obeying the order of his 
~employer, the order to proceed to the garage for 
the purpose of attending his duties there.'' 
The opinion fails to reveal any sound basis for the 
above quoted statement. There is nothing to indicate 
that Chandler's position was any different from that of 
thousands of other employees in all sorts of business·es 
and industries, who custom~rily report in the morning 
to some branch office or out-building rather than to 
their employer's main office. 
And again: 
''He (Chandler) was under the control and 
direction of his employer from the moment he 
left home to go to the garage for the automobile, 
and was at that time in the course of, and within 
the scope of his employment.'' 
Again we fail to find any basis of f~ct for the state-
ment. The opinion does not recite any evidence that the 
employer had the right to control either the route taken 
by Chandler or the mode of conveyance. .Of course if 
the employer did in fact have· such a right, and paid 
Chandler for his time in walking from his home to the 
garage, the result of the opinion is correct, and it may 
be criticized only in failing to reflect adequately the 
facts on which it is based. 
Defendants also rely on Kahn Bros. Co. v. Ind. 
Comm., 75 Ut. 145, 283 Pac. 1054. That case is a true 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
example of the special mission doctrine. On its facts it 
is wholly different from the case at bar. In that case 
the employee was injured while returning to work from 
his lunch. But in that case he had several important er-
rands to perform for his ·employer, and those errands 
were the chief reason for making the trip. The em-
ployee's going home to lunch was merely incidental to 
the main purpose of his trip, which was to make calls 
at several business and banking houses on behalf of his 
employer. The Court recognize·d the general rule, and 
also the exception to the general rule known as the 
special mission doctrine, and in discussing it the Court 
said: 
''The mission for the employer must be the 
major factor in the journey or movement and not 
merely incidental thereto.'' 
In the case at bar there is no evidence that Barney 
was engaged in any mission for his employer at all. He 
had nothing to do for his employer until he arrived at 
Magna. Until that time he did not become attached to 
his employment. 
We reiterate here, our reliance on Fidelity & Casual-
ty Co. v. Ind. Comm., 7'9 Ut. 189, 8 Pac. (2d) 617. That 
case was decided after both the Chandler and the Kahn 
Bros. cases. In distinguishing those two eases the Court 
speaking through Mr. Justice Elias Hansen, said: 
"The facts in the case of Kahn Bros. v. In-
dustrial Comm., supra, are readily distinguish-
able from the facts in the instant case. The ap·-
plicant in the former case was requ?Jre.d to leave 
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his employer's place of business t·o ·perform er-
ramds for his empZoy.er. While engaged in the 
performance of such errands he was clearly with-
in the protection of the Workmen's Compensation 
Act. He performed an errand for his employer 
before he ate lunch and was on an errand for his 
employer at the time he was injured. The fact 
that he ate lunch at home did not preclude him 
from the protection of the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act, because during the major part of the 
time he was away from his ·employer's place of 
business he was ~engaged in the furtherance of 
his employer's business and was so engaged at 
the time of his injury. The Chandler C.as.e tends 
more nearly to support the award in the instant 
case, but that cas-e does not go to the full extent 
that it is necessary to go to support the award 
here under review. At the time Edwim (Shufelt) 
'received the imjur~e~s which canlfls,ed his death he 
w:as in no sense under the control of Mis employer. 
If the testimony of Mr. Peck is to be believed, 
his ~employment did 1'/Aot begin wn)t~l he reached the 
Semloh Hotel. The time when he was t.a ente.r 
upon his employment had wot yet arrived. Under 
the facts in this case w-e are rum;abne to peroeime of 
amy ·re1ason W'hy the gene'rla:l role, that 1am empl,ovyee 
10n his w:ay to w-ork is 'YI)Ot W'ithitn the p'tioltle~Ct~on 10'{ 
the morkmen's ·Comp,evns,ation Act, does wot ~ap­
ply.'' 
'The reasoning of the Court in the above quotation 
is, we think, equally applicable to the case at bar. 
D·efendants have also cited a number of cases from 
foreign jurisdictions. We do not think it is necessary 
for this Court to go beyond the Utah cases for assistance 
·and direetion in reaching a decision in this case. How-
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eYer, since defendants have cited these cases, we set 
forth below a synopsis of each case together with a state-
ment of our reasons for believing· that the holdings of 
such cases are not applicable to the facts in the case at 
bar, and therefore such cases win not be of assistance 
to the Court in deciding the case at bar. 
It may be observed generally that nearly all of these 
cases are quite old and w~ere decided when Workmen's 
Compensation legislation was in its infancy in -this coun-
try, and at a time when judicial thinking on these prob-
lems had not crystallized. The C'Ourts were at that time 
more or less groping their way into a new field. 
JVIasStey v. Board of Ed., 204 N.C. 193, 167 SE 695. 
Plaintiff was a janitor in a pub~ic school. From time to 
time he was directed to make p·urchases of supplies for 
the school. As a matter of convenience to himself, he 
ordinarily purchased the sup·plies on his way to work in 
the morning, always purchasing at the same store. One 
morning while attempting to cross the street, h~e was 
struck by an automobile and severely injured. He was 
attempting to cross the street to go to the store for the 
purpose of purchasing certain supplies which he had 
been directed to purchase. Held Plaintiff was in the 
course of his employment at the time he was injured. 
It does not clearly app~ear from the statement of 
facts contained in the opinion of the Court, whether 
p;laintiff would have had to cross the street in any event 
in order to get to the school where he worked, or whether 
it was necessary for him to cross the street only by 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
reason of the fact that he had to go to. the store. If 
plaintiff crossed the street only for the reason that he 
had to do so to get to the store, then the case is undoubt-
edly correctly decided, since under those· circumstances 
he would have incurred the risks of crossing the street 
solely in pursuance of his master's business. On the other 
hand, if it we-re necessary for plaintiff to cross the street 
regardless of the errand he was performing, then the 
case would seem to be erroneously decided, since he 
would have had to incur the risks of crossing the stre·et 
in any event in order to reach his place of employment. 
In such case, the errand would be a mere incident of his 
trip, and not the prime reason therefor. 
But whether rightly or wrongly decided the case 
can be of little assistance to the Court in deciding the 
case at bar. There is no evidence that Barney had any 
errand to perform for his master on his way from Salt 
Lake to Magna, nor could he have been on such errand 
after he arrived at ~{agna until the car was first re-
paired. There is no evidence that it was repaired and 
ready to go. Kyle v. Green High School, 20:8 Ia. 1037, 
226 N.W. 71. P'laintiff's husband, who was school janitor, 
had completed his day's work and was at home. He 
was called by the school principal and asked to come 
back and take care of the lights in the school gymnasium. 
In response to this call he started to walk hack to the 
school, and was struck and killed by an automobile. Held 
Deceased was engaged in a sp~ecial mission at the time, 
and his widow was entitled to compensation. 
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A very similar Utah case, reaching an opposite re-
sult was Roberts v. Ind. Comm., 87 Ut. 10, 47 Pac. (2'd) 
1052, cited and discussed at p. 20 of our original brief. 
Roberts was called by his employer from his home in 
Helper, Utah, to relieve a fellow employe,e at Soldier 
Summit, Utah. While enroute from Helper to Soldier 
Summit in response to said call, Roberts was killed in 
an automobile accident. Held. Deceased was not at the 
time of his death on a special errand for his employer. 
In Re Raynes, 6,6 Ind. A. 321, 118 N.E. 387. This was 
a case where a collector went to another town, on a holi-
day, for the purpose of collecting some of his company's 
bills. He engaged a taxi to return home, and when he 
alighted from the taxi he was struck by another car and 
killed. Held. His injury was in the course of his employ-
ment. 
The reasoning of the Court in this case is far from 
satisfactory, and the basis of the Court's decision is not 
clear in the opinion. 
In Re Har~aden, 66 Ind. App. 298, 118 N.E. 142 
and Ind. Comm. V. Aetna Life Ins. c~o., 64 Colo. 480, 
17 4 Pac. 589 are very similar on their facts and may be 
conveniently discussed together. In the Harraden case, 
the plaintiff was an insurance man under the control of 
his home office in Indiana, and was agent of his com-
pany in Ohio and Michigan. He was ordered by his home 
office to proceed from Detroit, Mich., to Boyne City, 
Mich. While walking from the Boyne City railroad sta-
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tion to his hotel he slipped on the icy walks and was 
injured. Held. Plaintiff was in Boyne City on express 
order of his master, and therefore was in the course of 
his employment at the time of his injury. 
In the Aetna case, Lynch was employed by the 
Walker Co., a Colorado corporation, having its principal 
place of business in Denver, Colo., to act as foreman in 
the construction of buildings in Colorado, Wyoming, 
Idaho, Montana, Utah, Arizona and New Mexico. Lynch, 
having completed his work on a building in Mton, Wyo-
ming, was proceeding by automobile to Montpelier, Idaho 
to start work on his next assignment, and was fatally in-
jured in an automobile accident. Held. Dea;th occurred in 
the course of his employment and was compensable. 
In both of these cases travel was an essential part of 
the ·employment itself. In both cases the injured were 
where they were under specific orders from their em-
ployer. Neither case involved merely travelling from 
home to work. Rather both involved travelling from one 
working place to another, under express orders from the 
employers. 
Altman v. Kaufman Realty Co., (Pa.), 167 A. 394. 
Deceased had been employed by a realty company for 
a number of years and had no regular hours. He might 
he called upon a.t any hour of the day or night. He was 
called at a very early hour on one Saturday morning to 
go supervise ·certain alterations heing made upon a 
building owned by his ~employer. In response to the caH 
he left his home, and was killed a short time later while 
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alighting from a street car, apparently on his way to 
carry out his mission. Held. Evidence sufficiently sup-
ported finding that deceased was killed in the course of 
his employment. 
The opinion in this case is short, and not very il-
luminating. Apparently the basis of the decision, was 
that deceased was called at a very -early hour in the 
morning, which was in the nature of a special mission. 
The result is of dubious validity~ The fact that an em-
ployee is called to report for work at an unusually 
·early hour would seem to be a very unsatisfactory basis 
for holding that he was ·engaged in a special mission. But 
whether right or wrong the case can be of no assistance 
to the Court, because in the case at bar it is clear that 
Barney was not called at an unusual hour, but on the 
contrary was proceeding to his day's work at about the 
usual tim·e. 
Redme.r v. Faber & Son Co., (N.Y.) 119 N.E. 842. 
Deceased was employed by Faber Co. At some time dur-
ing the working day, he was sent by his employer to an-
other factory across the str·eet to put s-ome lettering on a 
trunk. On his way back to his employer's factory he 
slipped on the icy street, sustaining fatal injuries. The 
Court correctly held that he was in the course of his 
employment at the time of the accident. 
This case furnishes ·an excellent example of the 
special mission doctrine. The employee had reported at 
his ·employer's p1ace of business for his day's work. 
He was ordered by his employer temp1orarily to leave the 
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premises and go to another factory for the purpose of 
accomplishing another mission. He was in the service of 
his mas·ter at the time the injury occurred. His only 
reason for being on the street was the pursuance of his 
master's business. The differences between that case 
and ~he one at bar ar~e at once manifest, and there seems 
no occasion to labor the matter further. 
Milw,aukee v. Althoff, 156 Wis. 68, 145 N.W. 238. 
Deceas~ed was employed by the city, and his regular work-
ing hours were from 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. However, 
he was required to report to the foreman at 7 :30 A.M. 
to receive his day's instructions, and directions as to 
where he should work. On~e morning, after reporting and 
receiving his instructions, and while walking to his as-
signed place of work, he fell and sustained fatal injuries. 
H.eld. Deceased was in the course of his employment at 
the time he ·sustained the fatal injuries. The basis of the 
court's decision was that he had come within his master's 
control, and ''the relation of master and servant exists 
when the servant is under the master's control and sub-
ject to his direction." On this basis the case seems cor-
rectly decided. Here again, however, the differ~ence in 
facts is so great as to make the case of little help in 
solving the problem at hand. For in the case at bar the 
record is clear that Barney had not yet come under his 
master's control. 
Tnader Genwal Insuramce Co. v. Nwnley, (Tex.), 
80 SW .(2d) 383. In this case compensation was allow~ed 
for an employee who was injured while traveling to work 
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in a conveyance furnish·ed by his master for that prur-
pose. The case makes no mention of the special mission 
doctrine. It is based on an entirely different exception 
to the general rule, discussed as rule No. 5 in our main 
brief at page 16. The case can have no ap·plication to the 
case at bar, since the record is clear beyond controversy 
that Wilson never furnished transportation to Barney. 
Reese v. Natl. Surety Co., 162 Minn. 493, 203 N.W. 
442. Reese was employed by the surety company as an 
adjustor. His usual place of work was the company's 
office in Minneapolis ; and his usual office hours were 
8 :00 A.M. to 4:30 P .~1. At times he was required to go 
out of the City and attend to matters after office hours. 
He was sent on a special errand which required his 
presence out several miles from the office until 10 
o'clock at night. He was returning to his home when in-
jured. Held. He was in the course of his emp·loyment at 
the time of his injury, since he was where his duties 
called him. This case is another examptle of the special 
mission doctrine. The traY.el here was inherent in, and 
an essential part of the employment. Reese was in the 
furtherance of his master's business at the time of the 
accident. And ··h·ere again, the distinction is obvious. 
Barney was in no wise serving Wilson as he was travel-
ing to Magna. He was doing the same thing that millions 
of workers do every morning-traveling to work. 
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CO'NCL'USION 
Plaintiffs submit that the theory upon which de-
fendants seek to justify the award of the commission is 
bas~ed upon a misconception of the facts. Barney, at the 
time he was killed was doing nothing more· nor less than 
traveling to his day's work. The cases cited by defend-
ants do not support defendants' theory as related to the 
facts of this case. The cas~es relied upon by plaintiffs 
are good law and the principles ther,ein enumerated are 
applicable to the facts of this case. Thereforie the award 
of the Commission must be set aside. 
Resp·ectfully submitted, 
ARTHUR E. MOREiT·ON 
ELIAS L. DAY 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs. 
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